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A wave of regulatory reform is now transforming the U.S. electricity industry. As state and
federal authorities allow independent power producers to compete with utilities in supplying
electricity, consumers are paying close attention to the effects of this change on their energy
bills. Although deregulation poses significant structural challenges, the introduction of 
competitive pressures should ultimately lead to efficiency gains for the industry and cost 
savings for households and businesses. 
Last summer, electricity prices surged in states actively
engaged in deregulating the electricity industry.
Newspaper stories covering the development suggested
that deregulation had failed to deliver one of its
promised benefits—a cut in the prices paid by con-
sumers.1 Indeed, many observers concluded that open-
ing the industry to competition was actually driving up
electricity rates.2
In this edition of Current Issues, we consider the
consequences of injecting competitive forces into a 
system previously made up of regulated monopolies.
We begin by reviewing the developments that have led
to the deregulation of the electricity industry. We then
look at the economic basis of deregulation and explain
why, over time, restructuring should improve the effi-
ciency of the industry. Although the reforms have
clearly been accompanied by some problems, we argue
that both consumers and businesses should see lower
electricity prices—relative to those that would have pre-
vailed under a regulated system—as competitive forces
take hold.
The Structure of the Electricity Industry 
The electricity industry has three essential functions: the
generation, transmission, and distribution of electric
power. Electricity generated in power plants is first trans-
mitted over high-voltage wires, then distributed over
relatively low-voltage wires to homes and businesses. 
Historically, responsibility for all three functions in a
given region has belonged to a single utility.3 Regional
utilities were created in the belief that one large firm,
acting as a monopoly, could perform these functions
most efficiently. Such a firm would have the resources
to build and operate power plants on a large scale, with
no wasteful duplication in transmission and distribution
systems. As the only supplier in the region, this firm
would also be in an excellent position to monitor
demand and coordinate production to meet ongoing
changes in the public’s energy requirements. Overall,
this arrangement promised a high level of system reli-
ability. As for the costs to consumers, the government
regulators of the utilities were expected to ensure that
prices remained reasonable.
This industry structure has worked better for some
states than for others. As Chart 1 suggests, average
electricity rates differ significantly across states. For
example, rates in the Northeast tend to be roughly 
50 percent above the national average, while rates in
the Midwest and Northwest are generally below the
average.4 In recent years, these large rate disparities
have prompted many states—particularly those paying
higher rates—to begin deregulating the electricity
industry. In taking such a step, the states have been
encouraged by the reduction in prices achieved in
other highly regulated industries that were opened to
competition.
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The movement toward deregulation has also been
spurred by advances in technology. These advances
have eliminated some of the advantages traditionally
attributed to large monopoly suppliers and made it pos-
sible for smaller firms to compete. Innovations in power
generation—including the shift from coal-fired boilers
to natural-gas-fired turbines—have reduced the optimal
size of power plants. Perhaps more important, improve-
ments in computer technology and telecommunications
have enabled independent energy suppliers to coordi-
nate production in a given region so that the total supply
of electricity can adjust to the constantly changing
demand for energy.
At this stage, only the generation component of the
electricity industry is being opened to competition. The
restructuring is advancing on two levels: the wholesale
level, where federal legislation is driving the changes, and
the retail level, where state authorities are directing the
reforms. The next two sections examine how change is
coming about in each of these arenas. The discussion
makes clear why deregulation should, over time, bring
lower electricity prices to both consumers and businesses. 
Competition in the Wholesale Market
The first step in deregulating electricity generation has
been to create a wholesale market that allows indepen-
dent power firms to compete against one another and
against plants owned by utilities.5 A state-regulated
system of monopoly suppliers, of course, has no need
for such a market.
Background
The development of a wholesale market began during
the oil crisis in the late 1970s when the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 was passed. The act
encouraged the participation of independent power
plants that relied on renewable sources of energy as
their fuel for generating electricity. Utilities were
required to connect these independent facilities to the
nation’s transmission system, or “power grid,” and to
pay them a fee set by the state regulators. This arrange-
ment demonstrated that non-utility generators could be
successfully integrated into the power grid.
The passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 further
encouraged the participation of independent facilities.
This legislation set up a framework for widening access
to transmission lines operated by utilities under the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.6 In 1996, the
commission made broader access a reality by specify-
ing the conditions under which independent power
producers and power “traders” are given access to these
transmission lines.7
Admitting independent producers to the country’s
transmission system proved critical in creating a whole-
sale market for electricity. It enabled unregulated power
firms to sell electricity directly to utilities, without the
expense of building their own power grid or developing
their own customer base. 
In the last three years, regional wholesale auction
markets have emerged throughout the nation.8 In these
markets, both independent power producers and utilities
buy and sell electricity. The existence of the wholesale
markets has not only encouraged the start-up of new
energy firms but also radically changed the way many
utilities operate. Given the opportunity to buy electricity
in a spot market rather than from their own generating
plants, these utilities have chosen to give up the busi-
ness of generating electricity and to focus instead on
the still-regulated transmission and distribution com-
ponents of the industry. 
Effect on Prices
How will the development of a wholesale market lead
to lower prices for businesses and consumers? First,
both independent power producers and the utilities
have a clear incentive to operate efficiently. Under a
regulated system, power plants face little or no competi-
tive pressure to lower production costs. The utilities
charge their customers a rate that is fixed as a markup
over production costs—an arrangement devised by 
regulators to guarantee utilities a “reasonable” rate of
return. Although the states monitor the operations of
their utilities in an effort to keep costs down, the
absence of competing suppliers means that the states
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U.S. average = 6.6 cents per kilowatt hour
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2000d, Table 55).
Note: Average revenue is used as a proxy for the retail price of electricity. See
U.S. Energy Information Administration (2000a).have no standard of comparison for assessing the effi-
ciency of a given utility’s operations. 
With the creation of a wholesale market, however,
power plants lose the guarantee of a reasonable return
and must instead compete for profits. In this environ-
ment, the most efficient power plants earn profits at the
expense of high-cost power plants. Over time, market
forces push firms to develop new technologies and better
operating procedures to gain cost advantages over their
rivals. These cost advantages should ultimately trans-
late into lower prices for consumers and businesses.
Competition in the Retail Market
Most of the downward pressure on prices from deregu-
lation will come from promoting efficiency at the firm
level though wholesale competition. Some states, how-
ever, are concerned that utilities and independent power
producers will not be sufficiently motivated by market
forces to pass on any efficiency gains to consumers.
Consequently, a number of states have moved to rein-
force deregulation at the wholesale level by creating a
competitive retail market for electricity. 
At the retail level, competition means that individual
consumers are free to buy electricity from their local
utility or from another supplier while the utility retains
responsibility for transmission and distribution. Giving
consumers the power to choose between competing
firms helps ensure that the price savings realized at the
wholesale level benefit consumers. In addition, retail
competition provides firms with incentives to match
their products to differences in customer preferences.
For example, power companies can offer customers
electricity from renewable energy resources or charge
lower prices (or offer rebates) to those willing to cut
their use of electricity during peak-demand periods. 
Predictably, the states with the highest electricity
rates are at the forefront of the deregulation movement.9
California and Rhode Island began deregulation in early
1998. They were followed by other high-cost states,
including Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.
As of November 2000, twenty-four states and the
District of Columbia had enacted restructuring legisla-
tion or issued regulatory orders to promote competition
(Chart 2). Other states are investigating reforms of their
own, although many, particularly those with relatively
low rates, are approaching deregulation more cautiously. 
Deregulation Issues for State Governments
Economic logic suggests that deregulation will, in fact,
increase competition and lead to lower prices in the
long run. Nevertheless, state regulators must resolve
some complex institutional issues when they set out to
create a competitive retail market for electricity. 
Compensation for utilities. One important question
is how much to compensate the utilities for any unprof-
itable business pursuits they have undertaken at the
direction of state regulators. Key examples include
investments in nuclear power plants and costly long-
term contracts for oil fuel that were signed when oil
prices were high in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Under a state-regulated monopoly system, the utili-
ties were permitted to charge customers higher prices in
order to recover their losses on such ventures. But with
the restructuring of the industry, the utilities no longer
enjoy such protection against bad investments. If forced
to shoulder the full cost of their earlier commitments,
the utilities would be at an extreme disadvantage in
competing with new entrants in the power generation
industry. Utilities argue that, in fairness, they should
receive compensation because the business commit-
ments that proved so unprofitable were backed by the
regulatory authorities. 
Each state that has pursued restructuring has in fact
agreed to some amount of compensation.10 As part of
the deregulation process, utilities and regulators negoti-
ate the amount of compensation that will be collected
over a set period of time. Consumers are charged a fee,
regardless of whether they remain with the utility, until
the agreed sum of money is paid.11
In some cases, the size of the compensation bill for
consumers may shrink as deregulation progresses.
Many utilities in states that have established retail com-
petition are divesting themselves of some or all of their
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Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.
Commission or legislative investigation ongoing
Restructuring legislation enacted
Comprehensive regulatory order issued
Legislation/orders pending
No activitypower plants. These utilities are at times able to sell the
plants at prices higher than those anticipated when the
compensation figure was determined. If so, the amount
that customers are required to pay the utility will
decrease, accelerating the expected decline in electric-
ity rates under deregulation.12
Divestiture. State regulatory authorities must also
decide on a divestiture policy. Some states offer finan-
cial incentives to induce utilities to sell their power
plants; other states have simply ordered the utilities to
remove themselves from the energy supply business.
Regulators see divestiture as a sound strategy because it
eliminates the conflicts of interest that may arise when
a utility can choose to supply electricity from its own
facilities or from independent power producers. In the
regulators’ view, a utility that has no power plants of its
own can be relied on to buy the cheapest energy avail-
able in the wholesale market or, alternatively, to trans-
mit electricity purchased by consumers directly from an
independent energy supplier. 
Mandated rate cuts. The states must also weigh the
pros and cons of mandating rate cuts when retail com-
petition is introduced. By demonstrating the gains to be
achieved from deregulation, rate cuts can help to justify
restructuring efforts to consumers.13 However, rate cuts
can also reduce the incentive for consumers to switch to
a new provider, discouraging both energy suppliers and
customers from participating in the new market. 
Selection of reference rates. Regulatory authorities
seeking to develop a retail market typically set a refer-
ence rate—an estimate of the price at which the local
utility is selling electricity, exclusive of any charges for
transmission, distribution, or other services. The refer-
ence rate, known as the “shopping credit” or “backout
rate,” is used by consumers to compare offers from
competing electricity suppliers. 
The authorities have some discretion in setting the
reference rate. To provide the right incentives to the
developing competitive market, the rate should be a
true measure of the cost of generating electricity. A rate
that is too low will discourage entry by independent
energy producers by making the electricity supplied by
the local utility seem relatively inexpensive, while a
rate that is too high could increase purchases of elec-
tricity from power plants that are less efficient than
those operated by the utility.14
An ongoing role for government. States must deter-
mine who will be the provider of last resort for low-
income users and how to fund public policy programs—
such as those promoting conservation efforts—that were
previously financed by the regulated rate structure.
Federal lawmakers will need to clarify the dividing line
between state and federal jurisdiction, particularly in
matters of interstate power transmission and wholesale
market activity. Finally, the institutions entrusted with
oversight of the industry will need enforcement power
in order to maintain the reliability of the power grid and
ensure compliance with fair business practices.
Operational Challenges
Deregulating an industry, particularly one as crucial as
electricity, entails some significant operational chal-
lenges. Perhaps the most daunting task is ensuring that 
a deregulated system is able to maintain the power grid’s
minute-to-minute stability. Because electricity, by its
nature, cannot be stored, supply must be constantly
adjusted to match demand if the system is to continue
operating. This complex coordination effort is more dif-
ficult when the supply of electricity to the power grid
flows from multiple firms rather than a single utility.
In response to this challenge, government authorities
are working to set up Regional Transmission Organi-
zations (RTOs) that will take over from the utilities the
responsibility for adjusting the supply of electricity to
meet changes in demand. The RTOs will coordinate
operations and planning among utilities and indepen-
dent power suppliers on a regional and interregional
basis.15 The creation of these organizations represents a
significant start-up cost in developing a deregulated
electricity market. 
Building sufficient capacity in a restructured indus-
try is another important challenge. In the first phase of
deregulation, firms may delay adding capacity to their
power plants until they have a clearer idea of how the
market will operate. But even after a competitive system
is established, market forces may be inadequate to
guarantee that providers can always deliver a sufficient
quantity of electricity to maintain the power grid’s
stability during peak-load periods. Under a regulated
system, the authorities pushed utilities to build capacity
significantly above typical peak-load requirements as
insurance against any unusually large spikes in demand.
Utilities were compensated for maintaining this degree
of readiness by being allowed to charge higher electri-
city rates. 
With deregulation, consumers will see market-
driven rates that are more volatile than prices in the past
and that more accurately reflect the true cost of elec-
tricity. Rates will be higher in the summer and lower in
the winter (see box). Such seasonal fluctuations will
encourage conservation efforts and more efficient
energy management—for example, by prompting large
commercial and industrial users to find ways to cut
their requirements in high-demand periods in exchange
for lower rates at other times. On the supply side, price
spikes will motivate power-generating firms to build
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demand periods to maintain the power grid’s reliability. 
Clearly, many adjustments will have to be made as
states move forward in deregulating their electricity
industries. But the states will eventually learn the best
way to implement deregulation, and buyers and sellers
will become more comfortable with a competitive
market for electricity. In the end, consumers should see
electricity rates that are lower than they would have
been under a regulated system. Although quantifying
consumer gains from deregulation is very difficult at
this stage, the Department of Energy has estimated that
a typical family of four will save about $250 a year
through lower energy bills and reduced expenditures on
other electricity-dependent services and goods.16
Conclusion
Federal legislation to open the wholesale market to
independent power producers is bringing market disci-
pline to a sector of the economy previously composed
of regulated monopolies. As a result, profits will flow to
those firms that build and operate efficient power
plants. State authorities are adding to competitive pres-
sures on the industry by opening up the retail market,
giving consumers the power to choose their energy sup-
pliers directly.
As the states move away from an exclusive reliance
on utilities for the generation, transmission, and dis-
tribution of electricity, they will face a number of opera-
tional challenges. Most notably, they must learn how to
coordinate output from independent producers and how
to ensure that the system has sufficient capacity for
peak-load periods. If these challenges are met, then the
market forces introduced to the industry by deregula-
tion should cause electricity rates to drop below the
levels that would have prevailed under a monopoly 
system. The lower rates, in turn, should lead to an
increase in consumers’ disposable income and a drop in
the production costs of firms.
Notes
1. See, for example, Neela Banerjee, “A Dwindling Faith in
Deregulation,” New York Times, September 15, 2000, sec. C, pp. 1, 4.
2. In fact, sharply higher prices for oil and natural gas—fuels used
to generate electricity—were largely responsible for the increase
in rates. Capacity shortages in some regions also contributed to
higher rates.
3. A number of smaller utilities relied on electricity generated from
other utilities.
4. Of course, rate differences across states stem in large part from
differences in the type of power used to generate electricity.
Hydroelectric power, which is prevalent in the Northwest, tends to
be the cheapest, while oil and nuclear power, which are common in
the Northeast, are the most costly. In addition, some states are at a
disadvantage because their utilities signed long-term contracts for a
type of power that was priced very high at the time. Differences in
state taxation and operational costs may also contribute to rate 
disparities.
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Deregulation exposes the inherent volatility of energy
prices. With the development of wholesale markets for
electricity, price swings in response to changes in sup-
ply and demand conditions can be observed by utili-
ties, independent power producers, and consumers. 
The chart tracks daily prices in the New England
Power Pool, a recently formed wholesale auction mar-
ket, over a sixteen-month period in 1999-2000. Note
that while prices remained relatively low and stable
most days, dramatic price spikes occurred at times
because of supply disruptions or high demand during
heat waves.
One by-product of deregulating the electricity
industry will be the development of a host of financial
instruments to help market participants hedge their
exposure to price volatility. Adopting strategies often
applied to other commodities, these firms will increas-
ingly rely on futures and options to limit their exposure
to changes in the market price of electricity. 
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5. Useful discussions of electricity deregulation can be found in
Brennan et al. (1996), Council of Economic Advisers (1999), Joskow
(1997), and U.S. Energy Information Administration (2000c).
6. Congress is considering additional legislation dealing with inter-
state transmission and wholesale activity. The legislation would
address concerns about the adequacy and reliability of power in a
deregulated system where transactions may involve multiple players
and multiple states. 
7. Note, however, that government-owned utilities such as the
Tennessee Valley Authority are not bound by the 1992 legislation.
8. Independent System Operators (ISOs) under the supervision of
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission set up these markets.
Operators include the California Power Exchange, the New York
ISO, ISO New England, and, in the mid-Atlantic region, the PJM
Interconnection.
9. The benefits of competition will be less dramatic for states that
already enjoy relatively low rates, such as the mountain states and
states in the Pacific Northwest and the mid-South. Nevertheless,
other factors, including intrastate price variation and the need to
encourage firms to build more capacity over time, may compel
states to pursue retail competition.
10. The states differ in their time horizons for paying off “stranded”
costs. For example, Massachusetts set a ten-year horizon, while
California limited payment to five years. 
11. In California, discontent over compensating utilities fueled a
backlash against deregulation. Proposition 9, put forward in 1998,
contained provisions to prevent utilities from claiming such funds
and to force a 20 percent rate reduction. The proposition was voted
down. Also in 1998, Massachusetts voted down an initiative that
challenged the mechanism for recovering stranded costs.
12. The amount of compensation that will ultimately be paid by
consumers to utilities is uncertain. Estimates range from $10 bil-
lion to $500 billion. See U.S. Energy Information Administration
(2000a, p. 17).
13. Note, however, that the rate cuts are only temporary discounts,
because they are inconsistent with rates dictated by market 
conditions.
14. For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Flaim (2000).
15. The RTOs are also responsible for monitoring transmission
lines, a task that includes preventing utilities from using their own-
ership of transmission lines to favor their own power plants. The
RTOs take two forms—Independent System Operators and
Independent Transmission Companies. 
16. See U.S. Energy Information Administration (2000b).
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